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Introduction
Financial analysts play an important intermediary role in the capital market by providing information about firms, including estimates of earnings and price forecasts and buy/sell recommendations (Healy & Palepu, 2001) . Analysts' services are also demanded by external parties to assist in monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Brown et al., 2011) and valuing the firms (Bradshaw, 2011) . Bushman and Smith (2001) and Healy and Palepu (2001) find lower information asymmetry for firms with greater analyst following, suggesting that analysts provide an important contribution to the firm's information environment (Bushman et al., 2004) .
Studies that examine the determinants of analyst following have centred on firm characteristics, including institutional ownership (O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990; Hussain, 2000; Ackert & Athanaskos, 2000 , 2003 Fernando et al., 2012) and corporate governance (Baik et al., 2010; Yu, 2010) as well as the rules and regulations of the capital market (Tan et al., 2011) .
However, nothing is known about how analyst following is related to political connections.
Our first aim in this paper is to fill this void by providing the first evidence on the association between political connections and analyst following in Malaysia.
The intimate ties between the business elites and political leaders are an integral part of many economies, particularly the emerging economies, including Malaysia. In Malaysia, almost one-third of the listed firms are known to be politically connected (Faccio et al., 2006) .
The extant evidence shows that politically connected firms are highly opaque, and that there is greater information asymmetry between the connected firms and market participants, such as financial analysts. The opacity is due in part to the higher complexity and uncertainty of the income generation process created by the connection (Chen et al., 2011) . The protection that government provides to connected firms, e.g., government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006) and the imposition of tariffs on competitors (Goldman et al., 2013) , allows managers of these firms to practise greater discretion on financial disclosure thus further contributing to firm opacity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003) . Indeed, Chaney et al. (2011) find that the quality of accounting information is significantly poorer for politically-connected firms, and Lim et al. (2014) report that these firms have a less timely price discovery process. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) finds managers in connected firms camouflage their performance, increasing earnings opacity. All these studies suggest that connected firms have a poorer information environment. As analysts are attracted to firms with more informative disclosure policies (Lang & Lundholm, 1996) , we thus predict that there is a negative relation between political connections and the number of analysts following the firms. Since connected firms receive preferential treatment from governments 1 and are thus less reliant on external funding (Faccio et al., 2006) , analysts also have less incentive to forecast the earnings of these firms.
Our second aim is to examine the association between institutional ownership and analyst following. Institutional investors have substantial market power, influence, and sophistication in gathering and interpreting information about the firm (Grier & Zychowicz, 1994; Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) . These attributes provide institutional investors considerable advantage in monitoring corporate activities compared to other investors. Karpoff (2001) finds that institutional investors are successful in shareholder activism, prompting firms to act in accordance with investors' needs. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find a positive relation between institutional ownership and corporate governance in a cross-country study. Some supporting evidence of this in Malaysia is provided by Abdul Wahab et al. (2008) .
The effectiveness of institutional investors as a monitoring body has been recognized by governments that incorporate institutional monitoring duties into regulations in order to ensure 1 These preferential treatment include easy access to cheaper bank loans (Chaney, Faccio & Parsley, 2011; Claessens, Feijen & Laeven, 2008; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005) ; the awarding of profitable government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl & So, 2013; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar & Thesmar, 2007; Wu, Wu & Rui, 2012) ; and lower taxation (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar & Thesmar, 2007; Faccio, 2010) .
adequate oversight (Starks, 2000) . In Malaysia, the Finance Committee in Corporate Governance (FCCG) highlighted the need for greater involvement by institutional investors in corporate governance after the 1998 Asian financial crisis. This has resulted in the establishment of the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG), which aims to protect the interest of minority shareholders through shareholder activism and acts as an independent research organization to advise and encourage good governance practices amongst publicly listed firms (MSWG, 2010) . There are four founding members of MSWG, 2 which collectively dominate the market share of institutional investments in Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) .
Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2009) investigate the effectiveness of shareholder activism by MSWG, and find that MSWG-targeted firms earn higher stock returns than non-targeted firms in the long run. They note that the two most important issues raised by MSWG during annual meetings are financial reporting and corporate governance. Domestic institutional investors can thus provide effective monitoring of corporate behaviour (Chhaochharia et al., 2011) .
We argue that financial institutions are able to mitigate information asymmetry by pressuring firms to disclose information. Since institutional investors play an important governance role by promoting corporate transparency, we thus predict that firms with higher institutional ownership have greater analyst following, all else equal. Further, in performing their fiduciary duties (Hawley and Williams, 1997) , institutional investors are likely to demand for analyst services to help them assess the potential investee firms (O' Brien & Bhushan, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hussain, 2000; Jennings, 2005) . This suggests it is more profitable for analysts to follow firms with higher institutional shareholdings. Thus, analyst following is expected to be higher for these firms. 2 The four founding members of MSWG are the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Social Security Organisation (SOCSO), and Pilgrim Fund Board (LUTH). (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) .
However, MSWG shareholdings are not significant in explaining analyst following. 3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) was a social re-engineering and affirmative action program formulated by the National Operation Council in the aftermath of the 1969 racial riot in Malaysia. NEP was adopted in 1971 for a period of 20 years and ucceeded by the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991. The main objective of NEP (and its successor, NDP) is to achieve national unity by eradicating poverty, irrespective of race, and by restructuring the society to achieve inter-ethnic economic parity between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera (Gomez and Jomo, 1999) . Its second objective is to reduce inter-ethnic economic differences.
Despite the strong and well-documented presence of political connections in Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio et al., 2006) , we find no evidence that political connection is an important determinant of analyst following. The monitoring role of institutional investors, including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and nonconnected firms.
Our paper contributes in the following ways. First, it contributes to the increasing volume of research that has capitalized on the political economy of Malaysia (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2007; Bliss & Gul, 2012a , 2012b by showing whether a firm is politically connected matters to analysts' decision to follow the firm. Second, we add to the literature on the heterogeneity in institutional shareholders by showing the type of institutional monitoring in
Malaysia that matters to analyst following. Our findings have important implications for other countries in the neighbouring region where strong government intervention is a salient feature of the capital markets, and which can substantially affect the information environment for investors.
The rest of paper is set as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion of political connections and institutional investors in Malaysia. Section 3 outlines our research design, and Section 4 describes the data. Results are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. Selznick (1949) argues that political connections exist due to uncertainty of government regulations, and lead to firms working together with the government. Theories forwarded by North (1990) and Olson (1993) suggest that the connection provides government with a means of controlling the firms so that they will act in congruence with the government's agenda.
Background
Political Connections
Politicians have been known to extract rents generated by these connections (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) , 4 and in return, the connected firms would receive preferential treatment such as precedence over government contracts.
The growth in research interest on political connections in Malaysia has largely spun from the work of Gomez and Jomo (1999 Faccio et al. (2006) have also examined political connections in Malaysia in relation to transparency and other characteristics of connected firms. We add to this line of research by investigating political connections in relation to analyst following.
Institutional Investors
The purpose of the three government bodies in Malaysia, namely departmental agencies, statutory bodies, and government owned firms, is to accelerate Bumiputera participation in employment, education, and the corporate sector, in particular (Gomez & Jomo, 1999) . The latter is achieved through a restructuring of equity participation where foreign equity is to be reduced from 60 to 30 percent, Bumiputera equity raised from practically zero to 30 percent, and Chinese and Indian equity maintained at 40 percent (Norhashim & Abdul Aziz, 2005) .
Based on data gathered from various Malaysian Plans, we report that Bumiputera share ownership has increased from a mere 1 Since the Asian financial crisis, the role of institutional investors in Malaysia has changed dramatically in that they are now expected to play a much bigger role in the capital market, not only to facilitate the government objectives, but also to enhance good governance in firms.
Recent evidence suggests that the relation between institutional ownership, particularly by EPF, and corporate governance has strengthened subsequent to the corporate governance reform in 2001 (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) , in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in establishing MSWG.
Research Design
To test the research aims, we run the following regression model: ways to achieve these goals (Brickley et al., 1988 , Bushee et al., 2009 ), 5 we construct three additional institutional ownership variables to capture institutional investor heterogeneity in Malaysia. Mintchik et al. (2011) and Chan et al. (2013) provide evidence that the heterogeneity in institutional investors matters to the properties of analyst forecasts; transient investors are drawn to firms with lower forecast errors.
5 Bushee et al. (2009) employs trading behaviour to assign institutional investors into three distinct groups. The first is transient investors which are institutions with high portfolio turnover and high diversification. The second group is dedicated investors which are institutions that are characterised by low portfolio turnover and concentrated ownership. The final group, quasi-indexer are characterised by diversified portfolio and low portfolio turnover.
We first compute MSWG, which constitutes the cumulative shareholdings of the four founding domestic members of MSWG. For the second alternative institutional ownership variable, we single out the shareholding of EPF as it is the largest pension fund in the country.
The sheer size of EPF suggests that it has the resources to influence the governance structure of its investee firms, which should lead to better financial disclosure. Abdul Wahab et al., Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected and zero otherwise. A firm is defined to be politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders or top officers is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or a party (Faccio et al., 2006) . We extend the list of politically connected firms developed by Johnson and Mitton (2003) to include firms controlled by Khazanah Berhad 6 and those identified by Gul et al. (2010) . Appendix B provides the list of politically connected firms in our sample.
We control for a number of variables in the tests. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996) , Lang et al. (2004) , and Yu (2010), we control for earnings surprise since analyst following is expected to be lower for firms with greater earnings surprise. Earnings surprise (Forecast_Error) is proxied by the absolute difference between the analyst forecast of earnings per share (EPS) and actual EPS scaled by share price. Cross-listed firms are subject to greater disclosure requirements and are thus expected to be associated with greater analyst following 6 Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the investment holding arm of the Government of Malaysia entrusted to hold and manage the commercial assets of the government and to undertake strategic investments. Bradshaw, 2011). Larger firms also have a richer information environment which further attracts analyst following. We control for firm size using the natural log transformation of market capitalization as at the end of the financial year (Size).
Corporate governance quality is also controlled for in the test. Arguments for a positive relation between corporate governance and analyst following reside on the premise that good governance promotes corporate disclosure (Fan & Wong, 2002 ). This in turn lowers the analyst's cost of providing an earnings forecast and thus incentivize the analyst to follow the firm (Yu, 2010) . Conversely, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Jiraporn et al. (2008) regard analyst coverage as a substitute for corporate governance. Good governance in this case lessens the usefulness of the analyst report so that better governed firms with a richer information environment attract fewer analysts. We utilise three corporate governance variables that reflect the board structure. The first is Duality, which takes a value of one if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person and zero otherwise. The second is board independence (Board_Independence), measured by the proportion of independent directors on the board. The third governance mechanism that we control for is managerial ownership (Management_Ownership). Potential expropriation by managers is higher in firms with lower managerial ownership as the interests between managers and shareholders are less aligned in these firms.
Finally, we control for industry sectors. Moyer et al. (1989) argue that some industries are affected by regulatory bodies or legal regulations and constraints, and that the regulatory bodies which oversee these sectors may reduce investors' demand for external financial analysis by acting as a substitute to monitoring. We include year dummies to control for unobserved time effects, including changes in macroeconomic conditions occurring during the sample period.
Data
Our In Table 3 , we segregate the firms into those with "high" and "low" analyst following using the sample median (N=3) as the cut-off. Results show that firms with high analyst following have significantly higher institutional ownership and are larger in size. This finding is consistent with the monitoring role of institutional investors in enhancing corporate disclosure, and the greater transparency of larger firms. The univariate tests show that firms with high analyst following are also more likely to be politically connected (POLCON) and cross-listed (X_Listed), and have lower managerial ownership.
{Table 3 here}
We regress analyst following on its determinants in Contrary to expectations, we find a negative but insignificant coefficient for Political_Connection, suggesting that analyst following for politically connected firms is indistinguishable from that of other firms. One possible explanation for this is that the connected firms have the biggest slice of domestic institutional investments, which are mostly controlled by the government. In other words, the relation between political connection and analyst following is attenuated by institutional ownership. We test this in specification (3).
However, the results show that the interaction term Political_Connection × Institutional_Ownership is also insignificant. Of the set of control variables, we find that analyst following is positively related to firm size and the inverse of share price (I/Price), but negatively related to earnings surprises.
In Table 5 , we consider the heterogeneity of institutional investors in Malaysia.
Specifications (1), (3), and (5) report the results for EPF, MSWG, and OTHERS respectively.
In specifications (2), (4), and (6) (2)) is insignificant, suggesting that EPF plays a similar role in politically connected firms.
There is some evidence that politically connected firms have less analyst following, as shown in specification (2), consistent with the notion that connected firms are more opaque.
None of the interaction terms are significant. The results for the control variables are as before, with firm size, the inverse of price, and earnings surprise remaining significant in explaining analyst following.
{Table 5 here}
Robustness: Endogeneity
The relation between analyst following and institutional ownership may be subject to simultaneity bias since firms with higher analyst following are also likely to attract more institutional investors. O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) argue that analysts' decision to follow a firm and financial institutions' decision to invest in the firm are jointly determined through demand and supply considerations of brokerage (which employ analysts) and institutional investors. That is, analysts are motivated to follow firms with larger institutional holdings because of the fee that they can get for providing services to the institutions. At the same time, institutions are attracted by the marketing of brokerages' services and therefore are likely to invest more heavily in firms that are followed extensively by analysts (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Hussain, 2000) .
Our study employs an instrumental variable (IV) in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to address this potential simultaneity bias. We use Bumiputera directors, return on assets (ROA), leverage, and systematic risk as the instruments for the suspect endogenous variable, the percentage of institutional ownership.
The establishment of NEP and its successor NDP is to promote Bumiputera shareholdings in the capital market. Among the initiatives of the NEP is the establishment of Bumiputera-friendly institutions such as PNB, EPF, LTAT, and LTH, which are expected to skew their investment towards firms with Bumiputera directors. Having more Bumiputera directors on the board is thus an important determinant of institutional shareholdings. The presence of Bumiputera directors is a unique institutional feature of the Malaysian market and is not likely to directly influence the number analysts following the firm, except potentially through institutional ownership. Firm performance provides another instrument since institutional investors are likely to be attracted to firms with good performance, but is not directly related to analyst following. We use the return on assets (ROA) calculated over the period of five years to proxy for firm performance. Similarly, leverage and systematic risk are likely to affect institutional ownership (as a substitute monitoring mechanism) but not analyst following. Leverage is total debt to total assets, and systematic risk (Beta) is computed using the market model on the last 250 days of stock returns.
We control for corporate governance. Bushee and Noe (2000) Managerial_Ownership and Size since managerial ownership can act as a governance mechanism in mitigating agency conflicts (Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999) , thus attracting more institutional investment in the firms, and institutional investors have been known to hold a larger stake in larger firms (Gillan & Starks, 2003) .
Results from the 2SLS equations are presented in Table 6 . From the first-stage regressions, it is evident that the percentage of Bumiputera directors is a predictor of institutional investor ownership. However, the (partial) F statistic 7 is 7.193 for Institutional_Ownership, suggesting that the instruments are somewhat weak. We examine the validity of the instrument by computing the overidentification statistic, 8 which is chi-square (X 2 ) distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments and the number of endogenous variables. The statistic shows the instruments used for Institutional_Ownership are identified. Finally, the Hausman test does not reject the null of no endogeneity. This highlights the importance of addressing the endogeneity of institutional ownership, and indicates a preference for 2SLS estimates over that of OLS.
The results from the second-stage regressions are consistent with the OLS results, and
show an insignificant relation between Institutional_Ownership and ln(Analyst_Following). 7 We employ the F statistics benchmark figure suggested by Stock et al. (2002) which are: 1= 8.96, 2 =11.59, 3 =12.83, 5 = 15.09, and 10 = 20.88. 8 The Sargan statistics can be obtained by a regression of the second-stage residuals on all exogenous variables. If the instruments are valid, the coefficients on the instruments should be close to zero. The formal test is based on the R 2 from this model being close to zero. In particular, (n-m)*R 2 is distributed χ 2 with K-L degrees of freedom, where K is the number of exogenous variables unique to the first-stage and L is the number of endogenous explanatory variables. "n" is the number of observations while m is the number of variables in the OLS regression. Note that this test requires that at least one of the instruments is valid (i.e., exogenous).
This result remains insignificant when the interaction term Political_Connection ×
Institutional_Ownership is included in the test, as shown in specification (4). {Table 6 here}
Conclusion
We investigate whether institutional ownership and political connection are important drivers of analyst following in Malaysia, where political involvement in corporate decisions is a salient feature of the capital market. Our sample consists of 940 firm-year observations during the period 1999-2009. Despite the well documented preferential treatment and protection that governments provide to politically connected firms in Malaysia, we do not find any difference in analyst following between connected and non-connected firms.
Consistent with our prediction, we find some evidence of positive relation between institutional ownership and analyst following. Therefore, institutional investors seem to provide an important corporate governance mechanism by enhancing corporate disclosure policies, and this attracts more financial analysts to follow the firms. In examining the heterogeneity of institutional investors in Malaysia, we find that the relation between institutional ownership and analyst following is driven by EPF. However, the monitoring role of institutional investors, including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and non-connected firms. Our results are robust to tests of potential endogeniety between institutional ownership and analyst following. Institutional_Ownership is top five institutional investors' percentage shareholdings. Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person and zero otherwise.
Management_Ownership is the percentage of direct managerial shareholding. Bumiputera is the proportion of Bumiputera directors. ROA is the return on assets. Leverage is total debt to total assets. Beta is systematic risk, computed using the market model on the last 250 days of stock returns. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
